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Abstract
We highlight a novel trade-off with the use of breakup fees in employment
contracts. Under asymmetric learning about workers’productivity, the market
takes job assignments (or “promotions”) as a signal of quality and bids up the
wages of a promoted worker, leading to ineffi ciently few promotions (Waldman,
1984). Breakup fees can mitigate such ineffi ciencies by shielding the firm from
labor-market competition, but they reduce turnover effi ciency when there are
firm-specific matching gains. We show that it is optimal to use breakup fees
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if and only if the difference between the worker’s expected productivity in
the pre- and post-promotion jobs is small. Also, the relationship between the
optimality of breakup fees and the importance of firm-specific human capital is
more nuanced than what the extant literature may suggest.
JEL Classification: D82, M5.
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1 Introduction
Firms often incorporate breakup fees into their employment contracts in order to
dissuade their workers from moving to competing employers. Such breakup fees, also
known as “golden handcuffs,” are a contractual obligation for the employee to pay
back a part of his compensation (or to pay a “damage”fee) to the firm if he leaves
to join a rival. For example, deferred compensation plans such as retirement benefits
and stock options with gradual vesting force the employee to forfeit a portion of his
compensation if he quits sooner than later. Another common form of employment
contracts with a steep breakup fee is the contracts with the so-called “non-compete
clause”where, for a certain duration of time, the worker is contractually prohibited
from taking up employment with a competitor. Should the worker decide to move
while the clause is still in effect, he may make a buyout offer in order to release himself
from any legal obligations.1
In recent years, the use of non-compete clauses has proliferated in a wide range
of industries. A large majority of managerial and technical employees at all levels
of the organizational hierarchy are estimated to have signed contracts that include
some form of non-compete clause (Lobel, 2013: 51). It is also interesting to note that
contractual restrictions on workers’mobility are becoming commonplace at a time
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when the recent growth in recruiting networks (e.g., staffi ng agencies, social media
sites such as LinkedIn, etc.) has made a worker’s career progress within a firm– i.e.,
his job assignments or promotions– more visible to outsiders.
The current literature on breakup fees (including non-compete clauses) argues
for their effectiveness in protecting proprietary knowledge and in sharpening a firm’s
incentives to invest in human capital. But it fails to explain the widespread use of
such clauses in industries where such concerns are not relevant (Lobel, 2013). Also, it
cannot justify the aforementioned contemporaneity between the use of such contracts
and the increased visibility of workers’career progress. In this article, we present
a novel justification for the use of breakup fees that abstracts away from the issues
of investment or knowledge protection and is also consistent with the simultaneity
between the rise in the use of such fees and the increased visibility of the workers’
career path.
We consider an environment with asymmetric learning on workers’productivity,
in which the outside labor market takes the workers’job assignments (or promotions)
as a signal of their productivity. As shown by Waldman (1984), such signaling im-
plications of job assignments leads to ineffi ciently fewer promotions. We argue that
breakup fees can mitigate such ineffi ciencies. However, in the presence of firm-specific
matching gains, breakup fees may also reduce effi ciency in worker turnover. We ana-
lyze the optimality of breakup fees in light of this trade-off.
We explore this trade-offby using a simple two-period principal-agent model where
the firm (principal) has two types of job, 1 and 2. In period one, the firm hires an agent
with unknown ability and assigns him to job 1. The initial contract specifies a wage
for period one and a breakup fee payable to the firm should the worker decide to leave
for a competitor in the future. In period two, the firm privately observes the worker’s
ability and decides whether to promote him to job 2. The workers with higher ability
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are more productive in job 2 compared to job 1. Once the promotion decision is made,
it is publicly observed and multiple firms in the outside labor market– with whom
the worker might be better matched– compete in wages to bid away the worker. The
initial employer can make a counteroffer upon observing external recruiters’bids. The
firm offers a period-two wage if it prefers to retain the worker. Otherwise, it lets the
worker go and collects the breakup fee. However, the firm may renegotiate and lower
the fee if it prefers to do so.
As workers with higher ability are more likely to be promoted, and a worker’s
promotion is more visible publicly than his actual ability, job assignment becomes
a signal of quality. However, as just noted, this signaling implication of promotion
distorts effi ciency in job assignment (Waldman, 1984). The outside labor market takes
promotion as a signal of high quality of a worker and it may try to bid him away by
offering a higher wage. Since competition bids up the wage of a promoted worker, a
firm only promotes a worker if he would be suffi ciently more productive in job 2 that
he would be worth the higher wage that comes with a promotion. Consequently, too
few workers are promoted compared with what would be socially effi cient.2 Breakup
fees can mitigate such ineffi ciencies by creating a wedge between what the market
offers to a promoted worker and what the firm must pay to retain him– the worker
stays back as long as the market’s bid net of the breakup fee is dominated by his
current wage offer. Consequently, promotion becomes less expensive (for the firm)
and the firm has a stronger incentive to promote the worker.
But on the other hand, the use of breakup fee reduces the effi ciency in turnover:
When a breakup fee is in place, the firm is more likely to retain a worker even when
he is better matched with the external recruiters. As the firm lowers its promotion
threshold, promotion becomes a weaker signal of quality. As a result, the market
reduces its bid for the worker and the firm may find it more profitable to retain him
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by making a counteroffer. The ineffi ciency in turnover is detrimental to the firm
(ex-ante) since the firm could extract the matching gains up-front from the worker.
We show that the optimality of a breakup fee depends on the relative size of the
worker’s expected productivity in the two jobs inside the firm. It is optimal to specify
a breakup fee if and only if the difference between the worker’s expected productivity
in the two jobs is not too large. Moreover, when the use of breakup fee is optimal for
the firm, it is also socially optimal (i.e., it increases the aggregate social surplus).
The intuition for this finding is as follows. When the difference between the
workers’expected productivity in the two jobs is large, the firm already has a strong
incentive to promote them as they would be much more productive in job 2 than in
job 1. Workers who are ineffi ciently kept in job 1 are of low ability and thus would
have had small productivity gains had they been assigned to job 2. Thus, in such a
setting, the marginal gains from the more effi cient promotion that is brought about
by stipulating a breakup fee would be relatively small. In fact, such a breakup fee
would hinder the effi cient turnover of the promoted workers by lowering the external
recruiters’bid, and the marginal loss due to ineffi cient turnover would be relatively
large. (We argue later that there is no net change in ex-ante turnover effi ciency for
workers who are not promoted.) Consequently, it is optimal not to stipulate such a
fee.
By contrast, when the difference between expected productivity in the two jobs is
relatively small, the firm would promote very few workers– only those with suffi ciently
high ability. In addition, a marginal worker who was denied promotion would have
been considerably more productive if promoted. Thus, the marginal gain from the
improved job assignment is high, while the marginal loss from reduced turnover is low.
Therefore, it becomes optimal to stipulate a breakup fee, since this eases ineffi ciency
in promotion but costs little in terms of any turnover ineffi ciency that it creates.
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Our findings on the effects and the optimality of breakup fees have some important
implications. First, we offer a novel justification for the use of breakup fees even
in situations where the oft-cited benefits of such fees– protection of investment or
proprietary knowledge– are not relevant. Furthermore, as asymmetric learning about
worker quality is a key driver of the above findings, they suggest that breakup fees are
more likely to be used where information about workers’quality remains private (to
the initial employer) but information about job assignments becomes public. Indeed,
breakup fees need not be used by firms when workers’promotions are not visible to
the market or when workers’productivity is perfectly observed by the market. This
observation is consistent with the simultaneous rise in the use of restrictive covenants
and the visibility of workers’career progress within firms in the U.S. labor market,
as mentioned earlier.
Second, we highlight how the optimality of breakup fees is linked to the underlying
production technologies in an organizational hierarchy. To the best of our knowledge,
such a link has not been explored hitherto in the literature. An interesting implication
of our result is that breakup fees are less likely to be used when the nature of the pre-
and post-promotion jobs is significantly different. Such a difference is likely to imply
a large variation in the worker’s productivity as well.
Finally, our findings also contribute to the debate on the enforcement of employ-
ment contracts that attempt to restrict turnover. For example, in the U.S., courts
often refrain from enforcing a non-compete clause, citing harm from restricted labor
mobility (Malsberger, 2004; Lobel, 2013). However, in our setting, the court should
always enforce a contract with breakup fee: If the fee is optimal for the firm, then it
is also optimal for social welfare.
We also analyze the role of firm-specific human capital in determining the op-
timality of breakup fees. The extant literature suggests that the distortion in job-
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assignment is smaller when firm-specific human capital plays a bigger role in the
worker’s productivity (Waldman, 1984, 2013; Ghosh and Waldman, 2010). When
firm-specific human capital is important, the worker is more likely to be a better
match with his initial employer. Hence, the outside labor market is less likely to bid
for him, and the firm has a stronger incentive to promote the worker. In light of
this observation one may anticipate that breakup fees are used less often when firm-
specific human capital is more important for production. However, we argue that
the relationship between the two is more nuanced than what the above intuition may
suggest.
In particular, we show that for a given breakup fee (so long as it is not too large),
the above intuition continues to hold: The firm is more likely to promote a worker as
firm-specific human capital becomes more important. But there is a countervailing
effect. As firm-specific human capital becomes more important, the promotion policy
that maximizes the firm’s expected profit also calls for promoting more workers.
Consequently, the firm stipulates a higher breakup fee ex-ante to ensure a stronger
incentive for promoting a worker ex-post. It is interesting to note, however, that
this result may not hold if we assume that the outside labor market never bids for
workers who are not promoted, as they may not be visible to the market. In such an
environment it is indeed the case that the firm is less likely to use breakup fees when
firm-specific human capital becomes more critical. In other words, the impact of
firm-specific human capital on the use of breakup fees critically hinges on the market
visibility of the worker at different tiers of the organizational hierarchy.
Related literature: The extant literature on breakup fees has studied its impact on
various aspects of the employment relationship. There is a large literature on the role
of deferred compensation in human capital investment (Becker, 1964), tenure (Lazear,
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1979), and turnover (Salop and Salop, 1976). More recently, several authors have also
shown how a non-compete clause may be used to protect returns on investment in
human capital (Rubin and Shedd, 1981; Posner et. al, 2004; Bishara, 2006), to restrict
the diffusion of proprietary knowledge (Franco and Filson, 2006), to reduce turnover
(Kräkel and Sliwka, 2009; Garmaise, 2011; Mukherjee and Vasconcelos, 2012), and to
discourage employee spinoffs (Franco and Mitchell, 2008; Rauch and Watson, 2015).
By contrast, this article highlights a different trade-off that arises with the use
of breakup fees: Such fees improve the effi ciency in job assignments but they hinder
effi cient turnover. The environment in which this trade-off occurs has two salient
features, both of which are well documented in the current literature. (i) Asymmetric
information among employers leads to ineffi cient turnover (Greenwald, 1986; Lazear,
1986; Gibbons and Katz, 1991; Laing, 1994; also see Gibbons and Waldman, 1999,
for a survey). (ii) The initial employer’s (publicly observable) decisions– e.g., promo-
tions, outcome of a rank-order tournament, etc.,– may signal the outside labor market
regarding a worker’s quality (Waldman, 1984, 1990; Bernhardt and Scoones, 1993;
Zábojník and Bernhardt, 2001; Golan, 2005; Mukherjee, 2008; Ghosh and Waldman,
2010; Koch and Peyrache, 2011).
As discussed earlier, our paper is closely related to Waldman (1984). In a frame-
work similar to Waldman (1984), Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) consider a more
general model of promotion and turnover in the presence of firm-specific matching
gains. They assume that external recruiters can invest to acquire information on the
workers’quality and argue that in order to dissuade the external recruiters from doing
so (since this increases turnover), a firm may offer a preemptively high wage when
promoting a worker. The wage signals a potentially good match between the worker
and the current firm, and it discourages external recruiters from acquiring informa-
tion (as they anticipate a lower likelihood of successful bid). The assumption that
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the outside market can acquire the exact same information that the initial employer
possesses is crucial for this finding. In our model, such direct information acquisi-
tion is not feasible and the initial employer always enjoys some degree of information
advantage.
Another article that is closely related to ours is Burguet et al. (2002). They
study the link between the level of transparency about worker’s ability and the use
of breakup fees. In their setting, such fees help the firm to extract matching gains
from the recruiters. They argue that the firm would stipulate a larger breakup fee
when a worker’s ability was public information as the market bids more aggressively
when there is no adverse selection in turnover. This result is in sharp contrast to our
findings, as in our case no breakup fee is necessary when the worker’s ability is public
information.
The role of breakup fee in our model is similar in spirit to that of restrictive
covenants in the setup considered by Rauch and Watson (2015). In a model of
employee spinoffs in client service firms, Rauch and Watson show that a restrictive
covenant can create a favorable default option for the firm for future negotiations
if the employee threatens to start a spinoff by stealing the firm’s clients. But even
though the covenant protects the firm from losing its clients, it could be socially
ineffi cient, as it thwarts the formation of effi cient spinoffs. In our model, the breakup
fee also ensures a favorable default option for the firm when there is turnover. In the
process, it also protects the firm from labor-market competition. While such a fee
distorts turnover and perpetuates poor firm-worker match, it does improve effi ciency
in job assignment. Moreover, in our setting, if a breakup fee is profitable for the firm,
then it is socially optimal as well.
Finally, it is also worth noting that our model is reminiscent of Laing (1994).
Laing argues that asymmetric learning about worker quality may distort a firm’s
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layoff decisions when workers are risk-averse. As laid-off workers are perceived as
“inferior,”the spot market competition creates a wedge between laid-off and retained
workers’wages, leading to ineffi cient risk-sharing between the firm and the worker,
which, in turn, distorts the firm’s lay-off decisions. However, Laing’s model abstracts
from the job-assignment issue as all workers are placed in the same job.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model,
while Section 3 characterizes the firm’s equilibrium job assignment policy and worker
turnover for a given breakup fee. In Section 4, we elaborate on the trade-off between
ineffi ciencies in job assignment and turnover. The optimal breakup fee is discussed
in Section 5. Section 6 discusses some modeling extensions, including the role of
firm-specific human capital. A final section draws a conclusion. All proofs are given
in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a two-period principal-agent model that is described below in terms of
its five key components: players, technology, contracts and job assignment, external
offers and counteroffer, and payoffs.
Players. A firm (or “principal”), F , hires a worker (or “agent”), A, at the
beginning of period one. The worker works for the firm in the first period of his life,
but in period two he may leave for a different employer as two identical firms in the
external labor market (or external “recruiters”), R1 and R2, bid competitively for
him.
Technology. The technology specification of the firm is similar in spirit to that
in Waldman (1984). The firm has two types of jobs: job 1 and job 2. Job 1 is the entry
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level job where the worker is assigned in period one. The worker’s productivity in
job 1 is assumed to be fixed at ψ1 (> 0). However, in job 2 the worker’s productivity
depends on his ability, or “type”, a ∈ [0, 1]: if assigned to job 2 (with the firm) a
worker of ability a produces ψ2a (where ψ2 > 0).
At the beginning of period one, the worker’s ability (a) is unknown to all players
(including the worker himself), and it is assumed to follow a uniform distribution on
[0, 1]. But at the end of period one, a is observed by the firm (but not by external
recruiters or the worker). The information on a is non-verifiable, and hence, the firm
cannot credibly disclose it to a third party.
Job 1 is not available with the external recruiters, but they can employ the worker
in job 2.3 The worker’s productivity with the recruiters depends not only on his ability
but also on a matching factor, m, and is given by ψ2a (1 +m). The matching factor
m is unknown to all players at the beginning of the game, and it is assumed to be
distributed on [−1, 1] according to a piece-wise uniform probability density function
g(m), where
g(m) =
 α if m ≤ 01− α if m > 0
and α ∈ [1/2, 1). The associated cumulative distribution function is given by G (m).
Note thatm ≤ 0– an event that occurs with probability α– implies that the worker is
a better match with his initial employer than with external recruiters. The parameter
α can be interpreted as the measure for the importance of firm-specific human capital
in job 2. The more critical is the role of the firm-specific human capital in job 2,
the less likely it is that the worker would be a better match with the recruiters. The
value of m is revealed in period two; we will elaborate on this shortly.












This assumption implies that the ratio ψ1/ψ2 cannot be too large, and it simplifies
our subsequent analysis by ruling out certain corner solutions in the firm’s optimal
contracting problem.
Initial contract and job assignment. We assume that long-term contracts
on wages are not feasible. Also, as the worker’s ability (a) is neither observable nor
verifiable to a third party, the firm cannot commit to a promotion policy that is
contingent on a. Hence, we restrict attention to the following class of contracts: At
the beginning of period one, the firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (w1, d) to the
worker where w1 is the period-one wage and d is a breakup fee that the worker must
pay to the firm if he decides to leave for the external recruiters in period two.4 At the
end of period one, after observing a, the firm decides whether to assign (or “promote”)
the worker to job 2. Both the initial contract (w1, d) at the beginning of period one
and the subsequent job assignment at the end of period one are publicly observed.
External offers and counteroffer. At the beginning of period two, ex-
ternal recruiters (R1 and R2) observe the worker’s job assignment (j ∈ {1, 2}) as well
as the matching factor m, and make simultaneous wage bids bi (i = 1, 2) for him.5
We will maintain the convention that bi = 0 when recruiter Ri refrains from bidding.
Observing the bids, the firm makes a counteroffer to the worker, that consists
of a period-two wage wj2 and a (potentially) renegotiated breakup fee dR. Without
loss of generality, we consider two types of counteroffer, depending on whether the
firm decides to retain the worker or to let him go. If the firm decides to retain the
worker (who has been assigned to job j), it leaves the breakup fee unchanged (i.e.,
dR = d) and offers a period-two wage of w
j
2 such that the worker finds it worthwhile
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to stay with the firm rather than to join a recruiter and pay the fee. And if the firm
prefers to let the worker leave, it offers wj2 = 0, and it either leaves the breakup fee
unchanged (i.e., dR = d) or renegotiates it down (i.e., dR < d) so that the worker
finds it worthwhile to leave for the recruiter after paying dR to the firm rather than
to stay back.
The worker chooses the employer who offers the highest wage net of the (poten-
tially renegotiated) breakup fee. We assume that if the worker is indifferent between
staying or leaving, he stays with the firm.
Payoffs. All players are risk neutral and do not discount the future. Upon
successfully hiring a worker (A) of ability a, the firm’s (F ) payoff in period one is
π1 = ψ1 − w1, and in period two is
π2 =

ψ1 − w12 if A is not promoted and retained
ψ2a− w22 if A is promoted to job 2 and retained
dR if A is hired by an external recruiter
.
Similarly, the worker’s payoff in period one is u1 = w1, and in period two is
u2 =
 bi − dR if A joins recruiter iwj2 if A stays with F in job j .
Let Π := π1+π2 and U := u1+u2 be the aggregate payoffs of the firm and the worker




 ψ2a (1 +m)− bi if Ri successfully recruits A0 otherwise .
We assume that both the worker and the firm have a reservation payoff of 0.
Time Line. The following time line summarizes the game described above.
• Period 1.0. F publicly offers a contract (w1, d) to A. If accepted, the game
proceeds but ends otherwise.
• End of Period 1. Period-one output is realized and period-one wage (w1) is
paid. F privately observes A’s ability (a) and decides on job assignment.
• Period 2.0. R1 and R2 observe job assignment as well as the matching factor
m and simultaneously bid (b1 and b2) for A.
• Period 2.1. After observing the bids, F makes a counteroffer (wj2, dR). If F
decides to retain A, wj2 ≥ 0 and dR = d, but if F prefers to let A leave, w
j
2 = 0
and dR ≤ d (i.e., the breakup fee may be “renegotiated”down).
• Period 2.2. A chooses which employment contract to accept; pays dR to F if
he leaves for a recruiter.
• End of Period 2. Period-two output is realized, period-two wage is paid, and
the game ends.
Strategies and equilibrium concept: The firm’s strategy, σF , has three
components: (i) at the beginning of period one, choose the initial contract offer (w1, d),
(ii) at the end of period one, decide on job assignment j ∈ {1, 2} upon observing the
worker’s ability, and (iii) at the beginning of period two, upon observing the external
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recruiters’bids, decide on the counteroffer (wj2, dR). The worker’s strategy, σA, has
two components: (i) accept or reject the firm’s initial contract, and (ii) choose period-
two employer given the external recruiters’offer and the firm’s counteroffer. Finally,
a recruiter’s strategy, σRi (for i = 1, 2), is to choose a wage bid bi given the matching
factor and the firm’s job assignment decision.
We use perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as a solution concept (as defined in
Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; also see Watson, 2017, for a general definition of PBE
that is applicable to a larger class of games).6 Note that in a PBE, the external
recruiters’posterior belief in the continuation game is obtained through Bayes rule
even when the firm deviates from its initial contract offer. Thus, an equilibrium
strategy profile (and belief) must induce a PBE in every continuation game following
any initial offer (w1, d), and the optimal breakup fee is simply the one that induces
the highest PBE payoff in the continuation game. In what follows, we analyze the
optimal contracting problem accordingly.
3 Job assignment and turnover
In order to derive the optimal contract for the firm, we first need to analyze the
players’equilibrium behavior in the continuation game following an initial contract
(w1, d). In what follows, we characterize the firm’s equilibrium job assignment policy
and worker turnover for any arbitrary value of d specified in period one. Notice that
the wage in period one, w1, has no impact on the firm’s decision to promote the




3.1 An effi ciency benchmark
We begin our analysis by characterizing the promotion rule that maximizes the aggre-
gate surplus assuming that following the job assignment decision, turnover is always
effi cient (i.e., the worker leaves whenever he is a better match with an external re-
cruiter). The expected surplus generated by a worker with ability a (assuming effi cient
turnover) when he is promoted (SP ) and when he is not (SN) are given as:
SP (a) = Em[max{ψ2a, ψ2a(1 +m)}] and SN(a) = Em[max{ψ1, ψ2a(1 +m)}].
Notice that the worker’s expected productivity with an external recruiter is inde-
pendent of his job assignment within the current firm. Thus, in order to obtain the
promotion rule that maximizes aggregate surplus (when turnover is effi cient), one
only needs to compare the worker’s productivity in the two jobs when he stays with
the current firm. So, SP (a) ≥ SN(a) if and only if aψ2 ≥ ψ1. Thus, the effi cient







In what follows, the threshold aE serves as a benchmark for evaluating the extent
of allocative ineffi ciency in equilibrium where the private observability of ability leads
to ineffi ciencies in turnover as well as in the firm’s job assignment decisions.
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3.2 Equilibrium job assignment and turnover (given d)
We now analyze equilibrium job assignment and turnover and explore how the extent
of ineffi ciency is affected by the breakup fee.
As the firm cannot commit to a promotion rule, at the end of period 1 the firm
promotes a worker if and only if it is optimal to do so, given the worker’s ability and
the offer-counteroffer game that follows in period 2. As in our benchmark analysis
above, the firm’s promotion decision in equilibrium continues to follow a cutoff rule.
The argument is straightforward: Recall that the worker’s productivity in job 2 is
increasing in his ability (i.e., aψ2), but in job 1 it is constant (i.e., ψ1). Now, since
the worker’s period-two wage is determined in the spot market, but the external
recruiters cannot observe the worker’s ability (a), the worker’s wage conditional on job
assignment is independent of his ability. So the firm’s payoff from offering promotion
is increasing in a while denying promotion yields a constant payoff. Consequently,
the firm promotes a worker if and only if his ability is greater than a cutoff value a∗
(say).
In what follows, we solve for the equilibrium cutoff ability level a∗ as a function
of the breakup fee (d). Note that if a cutoff a∗ constitutes an equilibrium promotion
policy, the firm must be indifferent to promoting or not promoting a worker with
ability a∗– i.e., the firm’s expected payoff from the marginal worker must be the
same, irrespective of the worker’s job assignment. However, the derivation of the
firm’s payoff is somewhat involved, as it depends on external recruiters’bids, and
these in turn depend on the firm’s job assignment and counteroffer decisions. As the
equilibrium strategies must be sequentially rational, we derive these payoffs through
backward induction.
First, consider the firm’s payoff from keeping a worker (including the marginal
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one) in job 1. We begin our derivation of the firm’s payoff by first considering its
counteroffer decision. Trivially, if there are no offers from external recruiters (i.e.,
bi = 0 for all i), the firm offers a wage w12 = 0 to the worker to match his outside
option and retains him in job 1.7 But if the worker receives an external offer, the
firm’s counteroffer requires a more careful study.
Let b denote the highest bid that the worker receives; i.e., b = max{b1, b2}.
(Throughout this article we refer to b as the market bid.) Notice that upon re-
ceiving a market bid b, the worker (assigned in job 1) leaves the firm if and only if
b > ψ1. When b ≤ ψ1, the firm retains the worker by offering him (w12, dR) = (0, d)
if b ≤ d and (w12, dR) = (b− d, d) if b > d. Notice that in both cases, the firm leaves
the breakup fee unchanged. But if b > ψ1, the firm lets the worker go, and it collects
min {b, d} from the worker as a breakup fee; if b < d the firm renegotiates the breakup
fee down and offers (w12, dR) = (0, b); and if b ≥ d, no renegotiation is called for and
(w12, dR) = (0, d).
Now, moving backwards in the game, consider the external recruiters’ bidding
strategy for a worker assigned to job 1 given a promotion threshold a∗ (i.e., where
the worker is promoted only if his ability exceeds a cutoff a∗). Since the external
recruiters compete for the worker, they make zero expected profit (in equilibrium)
and bid the expected value of a worker whom they could successfully recruit (given
the firm’s counteroffer decision). That is, the external recruiters successfully bid for
a worker assigned in job 1 when:
























Note that b∗N is increasing in both m and a
∗. A larger m implies a higher pro-
ductivity, and hence, leads to a higher bid. A larger a∗ implies that the firm is more
selective in its promotion decision, and hence, the expected ability of the worker who
misses promotion also increases. However, the equilibrium bid does not depend on d
as it gets renegotiated whenever the firm finds it optimal to do so.
Using b∗N we can derive the firm’s payoff from keeping the marginal worker in
job 1. From the firm’s counteroffer strategy we know that when b∗N(m; a
∗) = 0, the
worker stays with the firm and the firm earns ψ1; but when b∗N(m; a
∗) > 0, the worker
leaves the firm and the firm earns min {b∗N(m; a∗), d}. That is, the firm’s payoff (as a
function of m and d given a∗) is:
πN(m, d; a
∗) =




min {b∗N(m; a∗), d} otherwise
. (4)
Next, consider the firm’s payoff from promoting the marginal worker to job 2. As
before, a promoted worker who does not receive any market offer gets w22 = 0. If the
worker receives a market offer of b, the firm makes a counteroffer and retains him if
b ≤ aψ2 but lets him go otherwise by (possibly) renegotiating the breakup fee down
to dR = min {b, d}.
Observe that external recruiters face a winner’s curse problem while bidding for
a worker in job 2: A successful bid necessarily implies that the worker’s ability is
relatively low (i.e., a ∈ [a∗, b/ψ2)) as a worker with higher ability would be retained
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by the firm.8 Therefore, the external recruiters’payoff from bidding b for a worker
assigned in job 2 (when the promotion cutoff is a∗) is:
Ea [ψ2a(1 +m) | a ∈ [a∗, b/ψ2)] =









∗ + 1)(1 +m) if b > ψ2
.
As discussed earlier, by virtue of competition between the external recruiters, their
equilibrium bids for a worker in job 2 must satisfy b1 = b2 = b∗P where b
∗
P solves





0 if m ≤ 0
ψ2a
∗ 1+m










The following remarks are in order. First, similar to b∗N , b
∗
P is increasing in m
and a∗, and it is independent of d (the reasoning is also the same). Second, the
equilibrium bidding strategies (both b∗N and b
∗
P ) maintain an implicit assumption
that the recruiters do not play weakly dominated strategies.9 Finally, in response to
the winner’s curse problem, the recruiters shade their bids, and the period-two wage
of a promoted worker is depressed. Moreover, the recruiters refrain from bidding
when a competitive bid is sure to fail (i.e., they choose b∗N = 0 if m ≤ (2ψ1/a∗ψ2)− 1
and b∗P = 0 if m ≤ 0).10
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The firm’s counteroffer strategy and the recruiters’bidding strategies described
above imply that the marginal worker (i.e., the one with ability a∗) always receives a
market offer and leaves the firm when m > 0, but stays with the firm at zero wage
when m < 0. Hence the firm’s payoff from promoting the marginal worker is:
πP (m, d; a
∗) =
 ψ2a
∗ if m ≤ 0
min {b∗P (m; a∗), d} otherwise
. (6)
If the cutoff a∗ constitutes an equilibrium, the firm must have the same (expected)
payoff from the marginal worker irrespective of his job assignment. So, a∗ solves:
EmπN(m, d; a∗) = EmπP (m, d; a∗). (7)
Observe that even though the recruiters’bidding strategy does not depend on
the breakup fee d, the equilibrium promotion rule does. This is because d affects
the firm’s expected payoffs from the marginal worker in the two jobs. The following
proposition characterizes the solution to equation (7) and illustrates how the breakup
fee affects the equilibrium ability cutoff for promotion.
Proposition 1 Given a breakup fee d, there exists a unique cutoff level a∗ (d) such
that the firm promotes a worker if and only if his ability a ≥ a∗ (d). The cutoff
a∗(d) is strictly decreasing in d for d < d̂ and independent of d for d ≥ d̂ where
d̂ ∈ (ψ2, ψ1 + ψ2). Moreover, a∗(0) > aE (= ψ1/ψ2) and a∗(ψ1) = aE.
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A key implication of Proposition 1 is that the larger is the associated breakup fee,
the more likely the firm is to promote a worker; i.e., the promotion cutoff a∗ (weakly)
decreases in d.
<<COMP: Place Fig. 1 about here>>
To see the intuition, notice that the breakup fee affects the surplus the firm can
extract from the marginal worker in case there is turnover. In particular, regardless of
the firm’s job assignment decision, the firm’s payoff (i.e., both πP and πN) is d when
the market recruits the worker by making a relatively large bid. Hence, an increase
in d increases the firm’s expected payoff from the marginal worker irrespective of his
job assignment (i.e., both EmπN(m, d; a∗) and EmπP (m, d; a∗) increase with d).
However, due to the signaling role of promotion, the market bids more often and
more aggressively for a worker who is promoted than for a worker who is not. Hence,
the marginal worker’s value to the firm increases more with the breakup fee when he
is promoted to job 2 than when he is kept in job 1– i.e., EmπP increases more than
EmπN as d increases. In other words, a breakup fee protects the firm from labor-
market competition irrespective of its job assignment decision, but this protection is
more valuable when the worker is promoted, since a promoted worker is deemed to
be of higher ability and receives higher wage offers. Consequently, the larger is the
breakup fee, the stronger the firm’s incentive to promote a worker.
But d affects the firm’s payoff (from the marginal worker) only when the market
bid exceeds d; otherwise, it gets renegotiated down with certainty. Thus, when d is
suffi ciently large such that under no scenario can the market bid more than d, it no
longer affects the firm’s payoff, and hence its promotion policy a∗ (d) no longer varies
with d, either.
Another implication of Proposition 1 is that, in the absence of any breakup fee,
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job assignment remains ineffi cient, as too few workers are promoted (a∗ (0) > aE).
This ineffi ciency is similar to the one discussed in Waldman (1984), and it stems
from the signaling role of job assignment that Waldman highlights. As a promoted
worker is more likely to be of higher ability, the market bids more aggressively for
a promoted worker. Hence, it is costlier to retain a promoted worker vis-à-vis a
worker who has not been promoted. As the firm’s expected profit from promoting
the worker decreases, in equilibrium, a worker is promoted only if he is significantly
more productive in job 2 than in job 1 so that the resulting productivity gains can
offset the wage premium that the firm must offer to a promoted worker. But as
discussed above, the firm can mitigate such ineffi ciencies by stipulating a breakup fee
in the worker’s contract (a∗ decreases in d), since this serves as a commitment device
that allows the firm to implement a more lenient promotion rule ex-post.
We conclude this section with the following two remarks. First, it can be argued
that in the absence of any firm-specific matching gains (i.e., if m < 0 with certainty),
in our model the possibility of counteroffer can remedy ineffi ciencies in job assignment,
since external recruiters would refrain from bidding due to the winner’s curse problem
discussed above (Golan, 2005). However, a distortion in job assignment à la Waldman
(1984) would arise whenever the signaling role of promotion leads to a wage premium
for the promoted worker (Waldman and Zax, 2016; also see DeVaro and Waldman,
2012). In our setting, the possibility that the worker could be a better match with
an external recruiter (i.e., m > 0) gives rise to such a wage premium. Even though
the counteroffer dampens the external recruiters’bid by creating a winners’ curse
problem, when m > 0 it is still profitable for external recruiters to bid for the worker,
and they will bid more aggressively for a promoted worker, as promotion signifies
higher ability.
Second, even though the use of a breakup fee may lessen ineffi ciencies in job assign-
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ment (as a∗ decreases in d), stipulating an arbitrarily large fee need not be optimal,
even with the possibility of renegotiation. A suffi ciently large breakup fee may lead to
ineffi cient job assignment by inducing the firm to promote “too many”workers. For
example, when d > ψ1 we have a∗ < aE, i.e., more workers are promoted relative to
the case where there are no information asymmetries (or no external recruiters). More
importantly, even if the firm chooses a relatively small breakup fee (e.g., d ≤ ψ1),
any such fee would accentuate ineffi ciencies in turnover through its influence on the
external recruiters’bids. As the following sections elaborate, the optimal breakup fee
trades off these two ineffi ciencies.
4 The nature of allocative ineffi ciencies
Before we characterize the optimal breakup fee, it is instructive to discuss the alloca-
tive ineffi ciencies associated with a given promotion cutoff, and how these ineffi ciencies
may vary as the cutoff changes.
Consider an arbitrary promotion policy where the firm promotes the worker if and
only if his ability a ≥ a0. Suppose that the cutoff a0 > aE, as is the case with the
equilibrium promotion policy in the absence of any breakup fee. Given this promotion
policy, there are four sources of ineffi ciency in the allocation of the worker. We discuss
them using Figure 2 (panel (i)) in which they correspond to the areas labeled as A,
B, C and D.
<<COMP: Place Fig. 2 about here>>
When m < 0 there is ineffi ciency in job assignment, as reflected by area A. The




to job 1 even though he would be more
productive in job 2. When m > 0, there are ineffi ciencies in both job assignment and
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turnover. There are two situations in which it would be effi cient for the worker to
leave the firm but he ends up staying (areas B and D), and one situation in which
it would be effi cient for the worker to stay with the firm but he leaves (area C).
More specifically, it is effi cient for a worker of ability a > ψ1/ψ2 (1 +m) to leave the
firm. However, when a < a0, the worker is not promoted and stays with the firm if
m ≤ 2ψ1/a0ψ2 − 1 (see equation (3)). Such misallocations are reflected by area B.
Similarly, when a ≥ a0, the worker is promoted and retained whenever ψ2a ≥ b∗P ,
or, equivalently, m ≤ (a− a0) / (a+ a0) (see equation (5)). Area D represents such
misallocations. On the other hand, it is effi cient for a worker to stay with the firm
if his ability a < ψ1/ψ2 (1 +m). However, such a worker is recruited by the external
market whenever m > 2ψ1/a0ψ2 − 1. Such misallocations are indicated by area C.
As mentioned earlier, the distortion captured by area D stems from the winner’s
curse effect. External recruiters shade their bids as a successful bid sends a negative
signal about the worker’s ability, i.e., the initial employer did not find the worker
productive enough to warrant a matching wage offer. Thus, for small m, the bid b∗P
may be less than the worker’s productivity with the firm in job 2 (i.e., ψ2a) and the
firm would find it profitable to match the bid, even though the worker would have
been more productive with an external recruiter.
Consider now the marginal effects of changing the promotion threshold (a0) on
these ineffi ciencies. Suppose that the threshold is lowered from a0 to a1 (see panel
(ii)). Clearly, this change leads to a more effi cient allocation of a worker with ability
a ∈ [a1, a0]: first, as the effi ciency in job assignment would require, such a worker is
now promoted to job 2 rather than kept in job 1; second, as turnover effi ciency would
require, such a worker would stay with the firm if m < 0 (gains shown by area A′)
and leave for an external recruiter if m > 0 (gains shown by area B′).
But the improved allocation of these types of worker comes at the cost of distorted
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worker turnover. First, note that a promoted worker is now more likely to be retained
by the firm– even if he is a better match with the recruiters– due to an aggravated
winner’s curse problem. As the promotion threshold is lowered, the expected produc-
tivity of a promoted worker decreases and so does the equilibrium bid. As a result,
the firm retains a higher share of workers. Now a worker of ability a is successfully
recruited only if m > (a− a1) / (a+ a1) > (a− a0) / (a+ a0) (the increased turnover
ineffi ciency is shown by area D′).
Second, turnover is also reduced for the workers who are not promoted. As more
workers are promoted, the expected quality of a worker who is kept in job 1 decreases.
Hence, the worker leaves for an external recruiter only when the matching factor is
suffi ciently high, i.e., m > 2ψ1/a1ψ2 − 1 > 2ψ1/a0ψ2 − 1. Such reduction in turnover
has two opposite effects on the (expected) aggregate surplus. It reduces the surplus
if the worker is of ability a ∈ [ψ1/ψ2 (1 +m) , a1], as he would have been more pro-
ductive with an external recruiter (loss shown by area B̂); but it increases surplus
otherwise, as such a worker is more productive with the firm and would have left for
an external recruiter if the promotion threshold had been higher (gain shown by area
C ′). However, since the matching factor cutoff, 2ψ1/a0ψ2 − 1, is the one for which
the worker has the same expected productivity with the firm (in job 1) and with the
external recruiters (see equation (2)), these two effects (associated with areas B̂ and
C ′) exactly offset each other.
Therefore, the promotion policy that maximizes the (expected) aggregate surplus
must balance the trade-off between improved worker-job matching (areas A′ and B′)
and worsened worker-firm matching for promoted workers (area D′). As we discuss




5 The optimal breakup fee
As external recruiters make zero profit due to competition, and the firm extracts
all the rents from the worker by suffi ciently lowering the first-period wage (w1), the
firm appropriates the entire (expected) surplus that is generated by the coalition of
the firm, the worker and the outside labor market. Consequently, the problem of
choosing the optimal breakup fee can be conceived as the problem of choosing d such
that the equilibrium promotion rule a∗ (d) maximizes the aggregate surplus over the
two periods. Thus, the firm’s optimal contracting problem boils down to:
max
d
Π (d) := ψ1 + S (a
∗ (d)) ,
where S (a0) represents the expected aggregate surplus in period two under an arbi-
trary promotion threshold a0, i.e.,
S (a0) := ψ1 Pr [no turnover, no promotion | a0]
+ Ea,m [ψ2a | no turnover, promotion, a0] Pr [no turnover, promotion | a0]
+ Ea,m [ψ2a (1 +m) | turnover, a0] Pr[turnover | a0].
(8)
The following proposition characterizes the optimal breakup fee.
Proposition 2 There exists a strictly positive cutoff ψ
1
(given α and ψ2) such that
the optimal breakup fee is zero if ψ1 ≤ ψ1 but is strictly positive otherwise. Moreover,
for ψ1 > ψ1, (i) the optimal breakup fee is increasing in ψ1 and (ii) the use of breakup
fee in the optimal contract enhances welfare as it increases the aggregate surplus.
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Notice that the firm need not use any breakup fee if the worker’s ability is pub-
lic or if the promotion decision is private. In both cases promotion does not play
any signaling role and hence there is no distortion in job assignments. Thus, a key
implication of the above proposition is that breakup fees are more likely to be ob-
served when the information on workers’ability is private (to the initial employer)
but information on job assignments is public.
This prediction of the model is consistent with the recent surge in the use of non-
compete clauses in employment contracts that could be conceived as contracts with
steep breakup fees (Lobel, 2013). One may assume that the recent growth in the
number and importance of recruiting networks (e.g., LinkedIn) has made a worker’s
career progress within a firm clearly visible to outsiders, while his actual quality is still
his employer’s private information. It is often argued that non-compete clauses are
used to protect a firm’s investment in human capital. But such an argument cannot
explain Lobel’s finding that non-compete clauses have proliferated even in industries
where human-capital investment hardly plays a role.
Another salient implication of the above finding is that the optimality of a breakup
fee is driven by the relative productivity of the worker in the two jobs: It is never
optimal to stipulate a breakup fee if the worker’s productivity in job 1 (i.e., ψ1) is too
low relative to his expected productivity in job 2 (as reflected by ψ2). Otherwise, it is
always optimal to specify a breakup fee in the employment contract, and the size of
this fee increases as the difference between the worker’s expected productivity in the
two jobs gets smaller. In other words, breakup fees are more likely to be used when
the production technologies in the pre- and post-promotion jobs are similar (e.g., they
involve similar sets of tasks).11
The intuition behind this finding is as follows. As discussed above, the firm’s
promotion threshold a∗ (d) is decreasing in d. Also recall that such a reduction in
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promotion threshold leads to a trade-offbetween the gains from improved effi ciency in
job assignment and the loss from more ineffi cient turnover for the promoted workers.
When ψ1 is small, the marginal gain from the former effect is lower than the marginal
loss from the latter. To see this, note that for low ψ1, the equilibrium promotion
rule a∗ is also low even in the absence of any breakup fee: As the worker is hardly
productive in job 1, the firm has a strong incentive to assign him to job 2. As most
workers are promoted (when ψ1 is small), the marginal worker who remains in job 1
is of relatively low ability and assigning him to job 2 (as effi ciency in job assignment
dictates) has only a small impact on his productivity. Thus, while the introduction
of a breakup fee does improve job assignment, its marginal benefit is rather small. In
contrast, its marginal cost stemming from ineffi cient turnover of promoted workers
is still significant, as most types of worker are assigned to job 2 in the first place.
Hence, when ψ1 is small, the marginal benefit of a breakup fee (in terms of effi cient
promotion) is more than offset by its marginal cost (in terms of reduced turnover of
the promoted workers), and it is optimal not to use such a fee in the employment
contract.
But when ψ1 is high, the opposite happens: The marginal benefit from effi ciency
in job assignment dominates the marginal cost of ineffi ciency in turnover. When ψ1
is large, in the absence of any breakup fee very few types of worker are promoted in
equilibrium. Thus, the marginal worker who misses promotion is of relatively high
ability and the gains in productivity from (effi ciently) promoting him are relatively
large. In contrast, the loss from ineffi ciencies in turnover are small as very few types of
worker are promoted in the absence of any breakup fees. Hence, when ψ1 is large, the




Finally, consider the optimality of breakup fees from the social welfare perspective.
Since the firm extracts the entire surplus generated by the worker, if the inclusion of
a breakup fee is profit-enhancing for the firm, it is also socially optimal– it increases
the aggregate social surplus generated by the coalition of the firm, the worker and
the outside labor market.
6 Discussion and extensions
In this section, we highlight the implications of firm-specific human capital in our
model and also explore the robustness of our key findings to a set of alternative
modeling assumptions.
6.1 Firm-specific human capital
The key role of a breakup fee in our setting is to shield the firm from the competitive
pressure on wages that results when the promotions are taken as signals of worker
quality. In the process, breakup fees improve effi ciency in job assignment, though at
the cost of ineffi ciencies in turnover. But such competitive pressure on wages is less
likely to arise when firm-specific human capital becomes more important in driving
worker productivity. Indeed, the canonical models on the signaling role of job as-
signment (Waldman, 1984; Ghosh and Waldman, 2010) suggest that ineffi ciency in
job assignment becomes smaller as firm-specific human capital becomes more impor-
tant. Thus, one may conjecture that breakup fees are less likely to be used when
firm-specific human capital is more critical for the production process.
In our model, one may interpret α as a measure of the importance of firm-specific
human capital. Recall that the larger α is, the less likely it is that the worker will be
a better match with an external recruiter. Unfortunately, an analytical derivation of
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the comparative statics of the optimal breakup fee (d∗) with respect to α appears to
be algebraically intractable. Nevertheless, as the following proposition indicates, the
impact of firm-specific human capital is more nuanced than what the above conjecture
suggests.
Proposition 3 (i) The promotion cutoff a∗(d) decreases with α when d < ψ1 and
increases with α otherwise. (ii) The threshold ψ
1
(i.e., the value of ψ1 above which it
is optimal to specify a breakup fee) is decreasing in α.
This proposition has two important implications. First, promotion incentives
increase as firm-specific human capital becomes more important, provided that the
breakup fee is not too high. When d < ψ1, the argument behind this finding is exactly
the same as the one discussed above. As the market is less likely to compete for the
worker, the upward pressure on wages following promotion is weaker, and hence, the
firm is more likely to promote a worker.
But when the breakup fee is suffi ciently large (d > ψ1), the firm is better off if
the marginal worker (the one with ability a∗ (d)) leaves, regardless of whether he
is promoted or not. (Notice that in this case the breakup fee exceeds the worker’s
productivity in both jobs, i.e., d > ψ1 > ψ2a∗ (d) .) In such a scenario, the firm
benefits from promoting the worker, as this increases the probability of an external
offer. However, this benefit becomes weaker as α increases: Since the worker is more
likely to be a better match with the firm, external recruiters are less likely to bid for
him. Therefore, the firm’s incentive for promoting the worker decreases with α.
Second, the aforementioned conjecture about the negative relationship between
the use of breakup fees and the importance of firm-specific human capital need not
hold. In our setting, as firm-specific human capital becomes more important, the
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firm is more likely to stipulate a breakup fee. As firm-specific human capital becomes
more critical (i.e., α increases), there are two opposite effects on the optimal breakup
fee.
As discussed earlier, firm-specific human capital dampens the competitive pres-
sure on wages and incentivizes the firm to promote more workers, i.e., a∗ (0) decreases
with α. Clearly, this effect reduces the need for a breakup fee in the optimal contract
when the firm tries to implement a specific promotion cutoff. But there is a counter-
vailing effect. When α increases, this lowers the promotion cutoff that maximizes the
(expected) aggregate surplus. As the worker is likely to be more productive within the
firm, turnover is less likely to be effi cient in the first place. So, if the promotion thresh-
old is lowered (when α remains high), the associated marginal loss from an ineffi cient
turnover is small, whereas the marginal gain from a more effi cient job-assignment is
large: Since the worker is now more likely to stay with the firm, assigning him to
the right job becomes more important. Thus, even though a∗ (0) decreases with α,
the firm may now want to implement an even lower cutoff for promotion, and use a
breakup fee to accomplish this.
However, it is important to note that the argument above hinges critically on the
fact that external recruiters can hire a worker even if he is not promoted. The result
is overturned if one assumes that recruiters bid for a worker only if he is promoted
while a worker who remains in job 1 is insulated from the outside labor market.12 In
such a setting, the firm is indeed less likely to use a breakup fee when α increases as
the countervailing effect mentioned above is weaker. The working-paper version of
this article (Mukherjee and Vasconcelos, 2015) presents a complete analysis of this
setting.
To sum up, the relationship between the use of breakup fees and the importance of
firm-specific human capital is more subtle than what the extant literature suggests;
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the market visibility of workers who remain in lower-level jobs plays a key role in
governing this relationship.
6.2 On the nature of the external labor market
Our model makes two major assumptions about the external labor market. (i) The
external recruiters can only offer job 2, whereas the initial employer can offer both
jobs in both periods. (ii) A competitive external labor market is available only in
period two, while the period-one employer is a monopsonist, as it is the only firm
that can offer the entry-level job. While these assumptions simplify the analysis
and exposition, it is important to note that the key economic effects that our model
illustrates do not hinge on either one of them.
It is straightforward to amend the model and allow the external recruiters to
offer job 1. In fact, our model is identical to a setting in which the worker’s output in
period one (in job 1) with the initial employer is 0, but in period two, his productivity
in job 1 with the initial employer is ψ1 whereas with an external recruiter it would
remain at 0. In other words, there is a firm-specific human capital accumulation in
job 1 that makes the worker more productive if he continues with the initial employer.
Therefore, even if the external recruiters can offer job 1, it is never worthwhile for
them to recruit a worker for this job, and the subsequent analysis of the optimal
breakup fee becomes identical to that in our initial setup.
One may also consider an alternative setup that closely parallels our initial mod-
eling specification. Suppose that the external recruiters can offer both jobs, and that
the worker’s productivity in both jobs is affected by firm-specific match factors. In
particular, assume that the worker produces ψ1 in period one (in job 1) with the
initial employer. But in period two, the external recruiters can hire him either for job
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1 or for job 2. In jobs 1 and 2 he produces ψ1 (1 +m1) and ψ2a (1 +m2), respectively,
where m1 and m2 are (stochastic) firm-specific matching gains and m1 6= m2. One
can show that even in such a setup, the signaling role of promotion makes promotion
expensive and too few workers are promoted, i.e., in the absence of any breakup fees,
job assignment remains ineffi cient. Moreover, so long as the breakup fee is not too
large (i.e., d < ψ1), the promotion threshold decreases in the breakup fee.13 In other
words, the key trade-off with breakup fees that we highlight in our model persists.
If one assumes that the external recruiters can offer job 1, it is also natural to
assume that there might be competition for the worker even in period one. How would
the optimal contract change in such a setting? Notice that, as discussed in Section 5,
the optimal fee d∗ is chosen so as to maximize the aggregate surplus generated by the
coalition of the firm, the worker and the outside labor market, and the firm extracts
the entire surplus upfront by lowering the first-period wage w1. If we assume that
there is competition for the worker in period one, the worker retains all bargaining
power in period one. Hence, the optimal contract would have the same breakup fee
d∗, but the firm would raise the worker’s period-one wage w1 so as to transfer the
entire surplus to him. In other words, the use of a breakup fee could be conceived
as a competitive response by the firms to the ineffi ciencies in job assignment, à la
Waldman (1984).
6.3 Renegotiation of breakup fee
Our model allows the firm to renegotiate the breakup fee (d) down whenever it is
profitable for the firm to do so. It turns out that our key results continue to hold
even if we assume that the breakup fee is not renegotiable. However, in such an
environment, breakup fees lead to a new effect: Such fees may aggravate ineffi ciencies
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in turnover by directly foreclosing external recruiters from bidding for the worker. A
detailed analysis of this case is available in Mukherjee and Vasconcelos (2015), but
it is relatively straightforward to see why the foreclosure effect may occur. When
the breakup fee is not renegotiable, an external recruiter successfully bids away the
worker only if his bid exceeds the fee. Therefore, when the fee is suffi ciently large
(in particular, if d > ψ1), the external recruiter may refrain from bidding even if the
worker would be more productive with the external recruiter.
As this effect occurs only when the fee is suffi ciently large, it does not affect our
findings on when such a fee should be used. When d = 0, the effects of raising d on
the margin are still driven by the same trade-offbetween effi ciencies in job-assignment
and turnover that we have discussed earlier. Hence, Proposition 2 remains largely
unaffected: A breakup fee is optimal only when ψ1 is suffi ciently large, and in this case
the use of a breakup fee is also welfare-enhancing. Similarly, the characterization of
the equilibrium promotion threshold, as given in Proposition 1 (i.e., a∗ (d) decreases
with d), continues to hold so long as d is not too large. However, if d is suffi ciently
large, a∗ (d) starts to increase with d. When the fee is suffi ciently large and cannot be
renegotiated down, it may be more profitable for the firm to let the worker leave than
to retain him. So the firm may find it optimal to be more selective in its promotion
policy: As promotion becomes a stronger signal of ability, it elicits more aggressive
bidding from external recruiters and raises the likelihood of turnover. Of course,
when d becomes even larger, external recruiters are completely foreclosed and the
promotion policy is no longer affected by d.
It is interesting to note that the discussion above is reminiscent of the model of
bilateral trade with potential entrants à la Aghion and Bolton (1987) in which the
seller may stipulate a breakup fee in his contract offer to the buyer in order to foreclose
a more effi cient firm from entering the market. However, as is the case in our model,
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such a foreclosure effect disappears if the buyer and the seller can renegotiate the
breakup fee up on entry (Spier and Whinston, 1995).14
6.4 Breakup fee based on ability
In some settings the firm may determine the breakup fee after observing the worker’s
ability. That is, the firm may simultaneously decide on the promotion of the worker
and on the breakup fee. How would the optimal contract change in such a setting?
While a complete characterization of the equilibrium appears intractable, two salient
observations can be made. First, in equilibrium, the breakup fee may vary with
ability, and hence the optimal contract also serves as a signal (in addition to the
signal implied by job assignment) of the worker’s quality.15 Second, the breakup fee
may always be used– the worker’s relative productivity in the two jobs no longer
affects the optimality of breakup fees. The latter observation is somewhat nontrivial
and the argument is as follows.
Note that in our baseline model, the issues of allocational effi ciencies and surplus
extraction can be decoupled: Surplus extraction is done using the period 1 wage
w1 and d is chosen so as to implement the promotion policy that maximizes the
aggregate surplus. When the difference in a worker’s productivity between jobs is
high, the gain in worker-job allocation from using d does not compensate the loss
in worker-firm allocation, and the firm optimally sets d = 0. But if d is specified
along with the promotion decision at the end of period 1, the choice of d also affects
surplus extraction. So long as there is a chance that a worker may receive an offer
from external recruiters, it will be optimal to use a break up fee: With a breakup fee,
it is always cheaper to retain a worker, and the firm receives a compensation in case
the worker leaves. This argument holds even if the difference between the worker’s
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productivity in the two jobs is large. So, in this case, d is used more as a tool to
appropriate surplus than as a tool to achieve allocational effi ciency. Of course, even
in this case, the use of d still has the trade-off we highlight earlier: It leads to more
effi cient promotion but compromises turnover effi ciencies. But this trade-off never
precludes the use of breakup fees in the optimal contract.
6.5 Severance payments and long-term wage contracts
Our analysis assumes that long-term wage contracts are infeasible and wages in period
two are set in the spot market. While this is a common assumption in the literature
(see, for example, Zabojnik and Bernhardt, 2001; DeVaro and Waldman, 2012), it is
interesting to note the implications of long-term contracts in our setting. Instead of
relying on breakup fees, the firm can use long-term contracts that commit to severance
pay or to period-two wages to alleviate ineffi ciencies in job assignment.
Consider the use of severance pay: The firm commits to make a lump-sum payment
to the worker when the employment relationship terminates, irrespective of whether
termination occurs at the end of period one or during period two. Suppose that
severance pay can depend on the job assignment. The firm can always implement the
promotion rule that maximizes aggregate surplus S (a∗) by choosing the payments
appropriately to mitigate the wage differential between jobs that stems from the job-
assignment signal. As in our model, the optimal promotion rule trades off effi ciencies
in job-assignment and turnover and, in equilibrium, both ineffi ciencies persist. Also,
in equilibrium, severance pay is larger in job 1 compared with job 2, as it must
generate a stronger incentive for the firm to promote the worker.
However, such a contract is profitable provided that the firm can ex-ante recover
the severance payment by lowering the period-one wage of the worker. As these
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payments are made to all workers irrespective of their ability and job assignment,
this would require the firm to significantly lower the worker’s period-one wage to
extract all rents. So, if the worker has liquidity constraints, such a low period-one
wage may not be feasible and the optimal contract may still fall short of achieving
the promotion cutoff that maximizes the aggregate surplus S (a0).16
The implications of the long-term wage contracts are also similar. Waldman (1984)
shows that long-term wage contracts that commit to period-two wages of the worker
(along with the period-one wage) can ensure effi cient job-assignment by making the
period-two wage contingent on the job assignment. As one would expect, the same
holds in our setting as well, even though, in equilibrium, job assignment may remain
ineffi cient as it trades off effi ciency in turnover. As in the case of severance payments,
such a contract improves effi ciency in job assignment by making it more costly for
the firm to keep a worker in job 1: The firm implements the promotion rule that
maximizes the aggregate surplus S (a0) by committing to a period-two wage that is
larger when the worker stays in job 1 than when he is assigned to job 2.
It is important to note, however, that the use of such long-term wage contracts is
seldom observed in practice, as the firm may lack the necessary commitment power.
Also, the key feature of the optimal contract mentioned above– i.e., committing a
higher wage to workers who fail to get promoted– is rather unrealistic. As promotion
tournaments are often used to provide work incentives, such a wage schedule may
undermine the incentive role of promotions. Also, similarly to the case of severance
payments, if the workers are liquidity constrained, such a contract may not be feasible




Breakup fees are contracting tools that firms frequently use to restrict turnover. Sev-
eral authors have argued that such a restriction could be beneficial to the firm as it
increases the firm’s incentives for investment in its workers’human capital, guards
against diffusion of proprietary knowledge, and protects the firm from potential losses
associated with employee spinoffs. This article highlights a novel trade-off associated
with the use of such fees in an environment with asymmetric learning about worker’s
productivity and firm-specific matching gains. The use of breakup fees reduces ineffi -
ciencies in job-assignment that stems from its signaling value (à la Waldman, 1984),
but their use also creates ineffi ciencies in turnover.
Our key finding is that the optimality of the breakup fee depends on the relative
size of the worker’s expected productivity across jobs. If there are substantial (ex-
pected) productivity gains from promotion, then it is never optimal to specify any
breakup fee in the employment contract. Moreover, when the use of a breakup fee
is optimal for the firm, it is also socially optimal as it increases the aggregate so-
cial welfare. In addition, our analysis suggests a subtle link between the optimality
of breakup fees and the importance of firm-specific human capital, as it critically
depends on the market visibility of workers at different levels of the organizational
hierarchy.
Notice that any personnel decision of the firm, including but not limited to job
assignment, that releases information on workers’quality to the outside labor market
makes the firm vulnerable to raids. This leads to higher wages for retained workers,
and the threat of such competition distorts the firm’s personnel decisions in the first
place.17 Thus, the benefit of breakup fees that we highlight here is not limited to
improving the effi ciency in job assignments, per se. Such fees may be used to mitigate
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ineffi ciencies in any personnel decision that may be distorted due to its signaling role
in the outside labor market.
There are several other economic effects that are interesting and relevant in our
environment, though they are beyond the scope of our model. One may assume that
to be productive in the “post-promotion”job, it is necessary for the worker (and/or
the firm) to invest in human capital. How would the presence of breakup fees affect the
incentives for investment? The answer to this question depends on whether the human
capital is general or firm-specific and who undertakes the investment.18 It would also
be interesting to consider the case in which the market could screen promoted workers
(see Ricart i Costa (1988) for a related model on managerial job assignment). In such
a scenario, the firm’s promotion policy continues to play an important role, as it affects
the worker’s information rent associated with the screening contract that the market
may offer (and such rents, in turn, can be extracted by the initial employer). Finally,
if there is a moral hazard problem in the production process, the use of breakup fees
may create an additional cost: this mutes work incentives by dampening external
recruiters’ bids and thereby lowering the prospect of future wage increments (see
Kräkel and Sliwka (2009) for a similar discussion).
The issues raised above offer useful directions for future research and may offer
additional insights into firms’ job assignment policies. However, the key trade-off
between the job assignment and turnover that we highlight in this article continues
to play a critical role in all these settings and we expect that our findings will be




This appendix contains the proofs omitted in the text.
Proof of Proposition 1. To simplify the exposition, letΠN(d; a∗) := EmπN(m, d; a∗)
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if d > ψ2
. (A2)
The remainder of the proof is given in three steps, each characterizing the equilibrium
promotion rule for a given range of values of the breakup fee d.
Step 1: Equilibrium promotion rule when d ≤ ψ1. In this case, ΠN(d; a∗) = ψ1 for
all a∗ ≤ ψ1/ψ2 (since 2ψ1/ψ2a∗ − 1 > 1 and G (2ψ1/(ψ2a∗)− 1) = 1), and ΠN(d; a∗)
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decreases with a∗ for a∗ > ψ1/ψ2. Hence, ΠN(d; a∗) is non-increasing in a∗. In
contrast, ΠP (d; a∗) is increasing in a∗ ∈ [0, 1]: clearly, ΠP (d; a∗) increases with a∗











Thus, given d, the equation ΠN(d; a∗) = ΠP (d; a∗), which defines a∗(d), has at most
one solution. To see that it has a solution, and that such solution a∗(d) ∈ [ψ1/ψ2, 1),






























= ΠN (d; 1),
where this inequality follows from Assumption 1, the fact that ψ1 < ψ2 (which is
implied by Assumption 1), and d ≤ ψ1.
We next show that a∗(d) decreases with d. Since ΠP increases with a∗ and ΠN





























and recall that ΠP increases with a∗ while ΠN decreases with a∗.
Finally, we obtain a∗(ψ1) = ψ1/ψ2 as ΠP (ψ1;ψ1/ψ2) = ΠN(ψ1;ψ1/ψ2) = ψ1. And
a∗(0) > ψ1/ψ2 as a∗(ψ1) = ψ1/ψ2 and a∗(d) decreases in d.
Step 2: Equilibrium promotion rule when ψ1 < d ≤ ψ2. As before, ΠN(d; a∗) =
ψ1 for all a∗ ≤ ψ1/ψ2. Observe that ΠP (d; a∗) is continuous and increasing in a∗,




















> ψ1G (0) + ψ1
∫ d−ψ1
d+ψ1








where the inequality follows from the fact that (1 + m)/(1 − m) > 1 and d > ψ1.
Thus, given d, the equation ΠN(d; a∗) = ΠP (d; a∗) has a unique solution in the interval
(0, ψ1/ψ2). We next show it has no solution in [ψ1/ψ2, 1] by showing that ∂ΠP/∂a∗ >
∂ΠN/∂a




∗) ≥ ψ2G (0) = αψ2.






























∗−1(1 +m)dm ≤ αψ2
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for all a∗ > ψ1/ψ2. Thus, when d ∈ (ψ1, ψ2], a∗(d) is unique and a∗(d) < ψ1/ψ2.











when d > ψ1and ψ2a∗ ≤ d, we obtain that a∗(d) is decreasing in a∗(d).
Step 3: Equilibrium promotion rule when d > ψ2. The analysis of this case follows
closely the analysis in the previous step. Once again, ΠN(d; a∗) = ψ1 for all a∗ ≤
ψ1/ψ2. Moreover, ΠP (d; a∗) is continuous and increasing in a∗ and ΠP (d; 0) = 0. Now,
observe that ΠP is non-decreasing in d, which jointly with (A5) in Step 2 implies that
ΠP (d;ψ1/ψ2) > ψ1. Hence, given d, ΠN(d; a∗) = ΠP (d; a∗) has a unique solution in
the interval (0, ψ1/ψ2). We next show it has no solution in [ψ1/ψ2, 1]. It suffi ces to
show that ∂ΠP/∂a∗ > ∂ΠN/∂a∗ for all a∗ > ψ1/ψ2 when d > ψ2. Clearly, (A6) holds
when d > ψ2 and, therefore, ∂ΠN/∂a∗ ≤ αψ2 for all a∗ > ψ1/ψ2. Next, observe that


















> ψ2G (0) = αψ2.
Thus, for each d > ψ2, the promotion cut-off a∗(d) is unique and satisfies a∗(d) ≤














Therefore, ∂ΠP (d; a∗)/∂d > 0 if and only if
2d
ψ2(a∗ + 1)
− 1 < 1 or, equivalently, if d < ψ2(a∗ + 1).
Observe first that when d = ψ2 this condition is satisfied for all a∗. Therefore,
a∗(d) decreases with d, at d = ψ2. When d = ψ2 + ψ1, this condition requires that
a∗ > ψ1/ψ2. Since (ψ2 + ψ1)a∗ < ψ1/ψ2, we obtain that a∗(d) does not change
with d when d = ψ2 + ψ1. Hence, the cut-off d̂ is defined as d̂ = ψ2(a∗(d̂) + 1) and
d̂ ∈ (ψ2, ψ2 + ψ1).
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is given in the following steps.
Step 1: Characterization of S. Given a promotion cut-off a∗, the expected total

























It is useful for the analysis that follows to characterize S ′(a∗) and S ′′(a∗). We do so
for all a∗ < 2ψ1/ψ2. Since, a∗(d) < 2ψ1/ψ2 for all d (see the proof of Proposition 1),
only this range of values of a∗ is relevant. Let h1(a, a∗) denote the function inside the
first square brackets in the expression of S(a∗) and h2(a, a∗) the function inside the
second square brackets. Then,
































Differentiating this expression, using the fact g is piecewise uniform with support in































Both are strictly negative since by assumption α ∈ [1/2, 1) and in both the second
term is clearly negative. Thus, S is concave in the interval [0, 2ψ1/ψ2].
Step 2: Optimality of a breakup fee. Given that S is concave and a∗(d) is decreasing
in d, setting d > 0 in the contract is optimal (i.e., a breakup fee is optimal) if and
only if S ′(a∗(0)) < 0. In what follows, we show that S ′(a∗(0)) < 0 if and only if ψ1 is
suffi ciently high.
We begin by showing that S ′(a∗(0)) decreases with ψ1. Observe that ψ1 affects










Let us analyze each term separately. Differentiating S ′ with respect to ψ1 and sim-
plifying (use (A8) and focus on the case where a∗ ∈ (ψ1/ψ2, 2ψ1/ψ2), since a∗(0) is
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always in this interval), we obtain
∂
∂ψ1
S ′(a∗) = 2α− 1. (A12)
To obtain ∂(a∗(0))/∂ψ1, we use the condition that defines a∗(0). Specifically, a∗(0) is
the value of a∗ that satisfies ΠN(0; a∗) = ΠP (0; a∗). Using (A1) and (A2) in the proof








































where the second equality follows from using (A13) to replace G (2ψ1/(a∗ψ2)− 1)
with a∗ψ2G(0)/ψ1 . Thus, ∂a∗(0)/∂ψ1 = a∗(0)/ψ1. We can now sign ∂S ′(a∗(0))/∂ψ1.





















Now, observe that the second term inside curly brackets is negative. Moreover, since
a∗(0) > ψ1/ψ2,






Hence, ∂S ′(a∗(0))/∂ψ1 < 0 and, therefore, S ′(a∗(0)) decreases with ψ1.
Next, we show that S ′(a∗(0)) > 0 for suffi ciently low values of ψ1 and S ′(a∗(0)) < 0
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for suffi ciently high values of ψ1. From (A13), it follows that limψ1→0 a
∗(0) = 0. From






2ψ2g(1)da = 2ψ2(1− α) > 0.
Let ψ̂1 denote the highest value of ψ1 that satisfies Assumption 1. Observe that
a∗(0)→ 1 as ψ1 → ψ̂1. From this, the fact ψ̂1 < ψ2 and (A8), it follows that
lim
ψ1→ψ̂1




0 [ψ̂1 − ψ2(1 +m)]dG(m) < 0.
Since S ′(a∗(0)) decreases with ψ1, limψ1→0 S
′(a∗(0)) > 0 and limψ1→ψ̂1 S
′(a∗(0)) <
0, there exists ψ
1
such that S ′(a∗(0)) < 0 (and a breakup fee is optimal) if and only
if ψ1 > ψ1.
Step 3: The value of the optimal breakup fee increases with ψ1 for ψ1 > ψ1. Suppose
ψ1 > ψ1. Let d
∗ denote the optimal breakup fee. Also, let â := maxx S(x). Since
S is differentiable, concave, S ′(0) > 0, and S ′(a∗(0)) < 0 (when ψ1 > ψ1), we know
that S ′(â) = 0. Moreover, observe that when ψ1 > ψ1, then â < a∗(0) < 2ψ1/ψ2. We
consider separately two cases regarding the value of â.
Step 3.1: Suppose â > ψ1/ψ2. The optimal breakup fee d∗ satisfies a∗(d∗) = â
and by Proposition 1, d∗ < ψ1. Hence, d∗ satisfies S ′(a∗(d∗)) = 0. This condition is
used to characterize how d∗ changes with ψ1. In particular, since S is concave and
a∗(d) is decreasing in d, then d∗ increases with ψ1 if S ′(a∗(d∗)) decreases with ψ1. We
















and S ′′ are given by (A12) and (A10), respectively. We next char-
acterize ∂a∗(d∗)/∂ψ1. The cutoff a∗(d) is defined as the value of a∗ that satisfies
ΠN(0; a
∗) = ΠP (0; a
∗). Using (A1) and (A2) in the proof of Proposition 1 it is easy















= a∗ψ2G(0) + d [1−G(0)] . (A15)
















































 > a∗ψ1 ,
where the inequality follows from the fact that the term inside the curly brackets is
greater than one. To see this, note that the only difference between the numerator
and the denominator of that expression is the first term of the former and the last


























where the last inequality follows from the fact that 2ψ1/(ψ2a∗)−1 > 0 since we know
that a∗(d) < 2ψ1/ψ2 (see proof of Proposition 1). Given the above, we can write
∂
∂ψ1


















































where the first inequality follows from the fact that the term inside curly brackets is
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negative (since S ′′ < 0) and ∂a∗(d∗)/∂ψ1 > a∗/ψ1while positive , the second from the
fact that the second term inside curly brackets is negative, and the third from the
fact that a∗(d∗) = â > ψ1/ψ2.
Step 3.2: Suppose â < ψ1/ψ2. The proof is similar to that of the case when
â > ψ1/ψ2 analyzed in the previous step. Again, we show that ∂S ′(a∗(d∗))/∂ψ1 < 0.
The difference relative to that case is that now d∗ > ψ1, which implies that the terms
in (A14) are (quantitatively) different. Specifically, since we are analyzing cases where
a∗ < ψ1/ψ2 (which implies that 2ψ1/(a∗ψ2)− 1 > 1), we have
∂
∂ψ1




and S ′′ is given by (A9). Regarding ∂a∗(d∗)/∂ψ1, following the same procedure as in
the previous step, we obtain that it is greater than a∗(d∗)/ψ1 while positive. Given
this, for all d∗ > ψ1,
∂
∂ψ1













































We next show this is negative. We begin by simplifying the second term inside the



















a∗ah(a)da) and the fact that [aH(a)]
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a∗H(a)da is identical to last term of (A8). Thus, from the fact




















Using this in (A16) and simplifying, we obtain that the expression in (A16) is strictly





which is indeed the case.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is given in two steps. In the first we prove part
(i) of the Proposition and in the second part (ii).
Step 1: The promotion cutoff a∗(d) decreases with α when d < ψ1 and increases
with α otherwise. The promotion cutoff a∗(d) is the value a∗ such that ΠN(d; a∗) =
ΠP (d; a











∗ − d)α. (A17)










ψ1 − 2α (ψ1 − ψ2a∗)− d(1− α)
, (A18)
which is negative, since the numerator in the second fraction is negative and the
denominator is positive because d < ψ1 and because by Proposition 1, a∗(d) > ψ1/ψ2
when d < ψ1.
Consider now the case where ψ1 < d < ψ2. In this case, ΠN(d; a∗) = ΠP (d; a∗) is
given by
ψ1 = αψ2a













Using the same procedure as above, we obtain that
∂
∂α
a∗(d) = (ψ1 − ψ2a∗) /
[









Finally, when d > ψ2, ΠN(d; a∗) = ΠP (d; a∗) is given by
ψ1 = αψ2a
























(ψ1 − ψ2a∗) /
[
α (1− α)ψ2 +
∫ 1−a∗
1+a∗










Note that in both cases above, the derivative is positive, since the denominators are
positive and by Proposition 1, a∗(d) < ψ1/ψ2 when d > ψ1.
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Step 2: The threshold ψ
1
is decreasing in α. The threshold ψ
1
is the value of
ψ1 for which S ′(a∗(0)) = 0. Since S ′(a∗(0)) decreases with ψ1 (see Step 2 of the
proof of Proposition 2), to prove that ψ
1
is decreasing in α, it suffi ces to show that
∂S ′(a∗(0))/∂α < 0 when ψ1 = ψ1.










Next, we characterize each of the components of this expression. From (A8) in the
proof of Proposition 2 , we obtain











Differentiating this expression with respect to α and using condition S ′(a∗(0)) = 0,





1− α . (A21)







ψ1 − 2α (ψ1 − ψ2a∗(0))
(A22)
and is negative.






























Observe that (ψ1 − a∗ψ2) < 0 since a∗(0) > ψ1/ψ2. Hence, to show that ∂S ′(a∗(0))/∂α,
we only need to show that term inside the square brackets is positive. Since ψ1 −
2α (ψ1 − a∗ψ2) > 0 (recall that a∗(0) > ψ1/ψ2), this is equivalent to showing that











a∗ > 0 (A24)
Using a procedure identical to that used in Step 3.2 of the proof of Proposition 2









((2− 4α)ψ1 − (1− 3α)ψ2a∗)−
2(1− α)ψ2 (1− a∗)
a∗(1 + a∗)3
.
Using this in (A24) and simplifying, we obtain that condition is equivalent to
− (2α− 1)ψ1 + αψ2a∗ −
(1− a∗) (1− α)
(a∗ + 1)3
ψ2 > 0. (A25)

















1There is strong empirical evidence that breakup fees are effective in reducing
employee turnover. Mehran and Yermack (1997) find that stock options can re-
duce CEO turnover (see also, Jackson and Lazear, 1991, and Scholes, 1991). Allen
et al. (1993) find similar effects of deferred compensation through pension plans.
Manchester (2009) and Hoffman and Burks (2013) show the effectiveness of “training
contracts”under which an employee must reimburse her cost of training to the firm
should she decide to leave. Analyzing the career patterns of top executives, Garmaise
(2011) finds that non-compete clauses also help reduce the turnover rate.
2Several authors have offered empirical evidence of the signaling role of job as-
signment and the resulting distortions as predicted in Waldman (1984). See, for
example, DeVaro and Waldman (2012), Bognanno and Melero (2016), and Cassidy et
al. (2016). Dato et al. (2016) also shows similar evidence in experimental labor mar-
kets. See also Baker et. al (1994a, 1994b) and McCue (1996) for empirical evidence
that promotion is often associated with large wage increases.
3The main trade-off that we highlight in the paper continues to hold even if job 1
is available with the external recruiters, but we maintain this assumption to simplify
the exposition. We will revisit this issue, along with the discussion of related modeling
choices, later in Section 6.2.
4Even though we model the payment d as a breakup fee, with a slight modification
to our setup, we can reinterpret this payment as a deferred compensation, and all our
findings would continue to hold. In particular, we may assume that d is simply a
part of the worker’s period-one wage that is paid at the end of period two in addition
Mukherjee and Vasconcelos
56
to a non-negative period-two wage, provided that the worker continues to work for
the firm. In other words, a firm commiting to a deferred payment d is contractually
obligated to pay the worker at least d (as total compensation) in period two if he
stays with the firm.
5That m is revealed to the recruiters after the firm makes its promotion decision
is assumed only for modeling convenience. For the purpose of our analysis, the key
assumption is that m is not known to the firm when it makes the promotion decision.
This is a natural assumption in many environments where the initial employer may
not have complete information on the productivity of his worker (or even on job
vacancies) in a competing firm, and this information is revealed only after the worker
generates offers from the potential recruiters.
6Formally, in our framework, a PBE is defined as follows: Given the initial contract
(w1, d) and the subsequent job assignment j ∈ {1, 2}, let µ (a | (w1, d) , j) be the










with the recruiters’belief µ∗ constitute a PBE if (i) σ∗ is sequentially rational given
µ∗, (ii) on-equilibrium path µ∗ is obtained through Bayes rule given the prior belief on
ability and the strategies of the players, and (iii) off-equilibrium path µ∗ satisfies the
following restriction. If the firm deviates in period one and offers an initial contract
(w′1, d
′), the posterior belief of the recruiters µ∗ (a | (w′1, d′) , j) must also be obtained
through Bayes rule defined as follows: Given an initial contract (w′1, d
′) ∈ R2 and the
worker’s type a ∈ [0, 1], denote σ∗JF : R2 × [0, 1] → {1, 2} as the component of the
firm’s strategy σ∗F that defines the firm’s job assignment decision. We require
µ∗ (a | (w′1, d′) , j) =
Pr
(
j | a, (w′1, d′) , σ∗JF
)
Pr (a)




Also, the worker’s belief on his ability remains unaffected by the firm’s initial offer.
Note that the restriction on the off-equilibrium belief invokes the “no signaling what
you don’t know”and “use of Bayes rule whenever possible”conditions suggested by
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). The initial contract (w1, d) does not affect beliefs on
ablility as it is offered before the ability is revealed. Also, in every continuation game
following any initial contract offer by the firm, the recruiters update their beliefs using
Bayes rule given their (common) prior belief and the firm’s job assignment decision
(under his strategy σ∗JF given the initial contract (w1, d)).
7In our setting, the outside option of the worker in period two is the payoff he
would get if he left the firm but did not get hired by any external recruiter. By our
modeling assumptions, this payoff is zero. That is, we implicitly assume that the firm
cannot contractually require a breakup fee from the worker should he leave the firm
irrespective of his subsequent employment status. This is a natural assumption since,
in practice, any clause in a labor contract that imposes restrictions on the workers’
mobility, such as a breakup fee, must be limited in scope in order to be enforced by
courts. At the same time, the court cannot force the worker to continue working for
any specific employer.
8The winner’s curse problem with the recruiters’bid has also been highlighted in
several other models of job assignment and external offers, e.g., Golan, 2005; DeVaro
and Waldman, 2012. In these models, the worker is always a better match with
the initial employer and the winner’s curse effect ensures that recruiters only bid for
the least productive worker who could be promoted. In contrast, in our setting, the
equilibrium bids could be higher than the productivity of the marginal type (i.e.,
ψ2a
∗(1 +m)), as we allow for the worker to be a better match with the recruiter.
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9This is a standard assumption in the literature (see, e.g., DeVaro and Waldman,
2012). Otherwise, there may exist other equilibria whereby the recruiters bid more
than the expected value of the worker (to the recruiters) if the firm is expected with
certainty to retain the worker by making a counteroffer. One may rule out such
equilibria as they are not “trembling hand perfect”: If there is a small probability
that the worker may mistakenly accept the recruiters’bid, then the recruiter is strictly
better off not placing a bid that is higher than its valuation for the worker. Such
equilibria in dominated strategies also do not survive the “market-Nash”refinement
of Waldman (1984).
10One may justify this assumption by considering an infinitesimal cost of placing a
bid. Hence, if a recruiter is certain that he cannot lure away a worker by bidding the
most he can without incurring a loss, he will prefer not to bid for the worker.
11Unfortunately, empirical findings on this issue are rather scant as task variations
across jobs in the organizational hierarchies may be diffi cult to measure. An empirical
test of our prediction can potentially follow the approach suggested in DeVaro et al.
(forthcoming). In an analysis of discrimination in labor markets, they construct a
measure of task variability from information on factors such as knowledge required,
supervision received, guidelines, etc., that describe the nature of a given job within
the organizational hierarchy of a given firm.
12Such an environment is reminiscent of Milgrom and Oster (1987). In our setting,
one can justify such behavior by the the recruiters by assuming that if a worker with
suffi ciently low ability is placed in job 2, he may cause significant damage to the firm’s
value. As the external recruiters never observe the worker’s ability, in equilibrium,
they never bid for a worker who has been retained in job 1.
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13We omit the formal derivation of this result as it closely parallels our initial
analysis.
14Spier and Whinston (1995) also note that even with renegotiation, the market
foreclosure effect reappears if the seller needs to make relationship-specific investments
and the entrant has some market power. In the context of our model, this finding
suggests that if the initial employer invests in its worker for firm-specific human
capital accumulation and if recruiters can make take-it-or-leave-it offers, then contract
renegotiation need not rule out the possibility of market foreclosure. A complete
analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this article and remains an interesting
topic for future research.
15A similar issue is highlighted in Bernhardt and Scoones (1993).
16Liquidity constraints can be less binding under contracts with breakup fees as
the worker may have lower rents in period two (hence the period-one wage may not
have to be lowered as much to ensure complete rent extraction).
17For example, Loveman and O’Connell (1996) offer a case study on an IT firm
where the firmmust decide whether to send its software programmers to the clients’premises
or to require them to work in-house (and ship out the final product to the client).
The firm experiences a high rate of turnover among the workers who are sent to the
clients’sites as the client firms learn more about the quality of the workers and bid
away the better ones. The turnover risk distorts the firm’s job design policy as it
becomes biased towards in-house projects.
18Golan (2005) addresses these issues in a related environment but does not con-
sider breakup fees or matching gains with the outside labor market. Also see Bern-
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ψ1 ψ2 d̂ ψ1 + ψ2




Figure 1. The equilibrium cut-off for promotion as a
function of the break-up fee (d).




















































Panel (i) Panel (ii)
Figure 2. The allocative ineffi ciencies associated with
a given promotion policy.
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